提出互惠公平机制,解决合作中可复制资源导致的收益不公问题。
A Mechanism for Mutual Fairness in Cooperative Games with Replicable Resources -- Extended Version
- 基于博弈论设计新公平机制,满足双向受益对等
- 证明机制满足平衡互惠公理,确保每对参与者互惠均等
- 适用于数据共享、模型协作等可复制资源场景
当前AI研究聚焦于人工与人类代理协同实现全局目标的智能系统,如协作学习——通过个体代理的数据训练全局模型。这类系统的核心挑战在于保障安全与人类价值观对齐,尤其在达成目标后如何公平分配奖励。合作博弈论通过价值函数和收益函数为协作代理提供抽象建模,可通过设定公平公理并设计具体机制来形式化公平分配。经典合作博弈理论(如谢普利值)假设资源不可复制,但数据与模型具有无限可复制性,需引入新的公平概念与机制。本论文提出一种机制并证明其满足‘互惠公平’性质,由平衡互惠公理定义:任意两参与者间,彼此参与带来的收益必须相等,从而防止策略性剥削与分配失衡。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
The latest developments in AI focus on agentic systems where artificial and human agents cooperate to realize global goals. An example is collaborative learning, which aims to train a global model based on data from individual agents. A major challenge in designing such systems is to guarantee safety and alignment with human values, particularly a fair distribution of rewards upon achieving the global goal. Cooperative game theory offers useful abstractions of cooperating agents via value functions, which assign value to each coalition, and via reward functions. With these, the idea of fair allocation can be formalized by specifying fairness axioms and designing concrete mechanisms. Classical cooperative game theory, exemplified by the Shapley value, does not fully capture scenarios like collaborative learning, as it assumes nonreplicable resources, whereas data and models can be replicated. Infinite replicability requires a generalized notion of fairness, formalized through new axioms and mechanisms. These must address imbalances in reciprocal benefits among participants, which can lead to strategic exploitation and unfair allocations. The main contribution of this paper is a mechanism and a proof that it fulfills the property of mutual fairness, formalized by the Balanced Reciprocity Axiom. It ensures that, for every pair of players, each benefits equally from the participation of the other.
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