提出模拟医疗多模态RAG系统漏洞的攻击框架，揭示其安全风险。

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) augmented with Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) are increasingly employed in medical AI to enhance factual grounding through external clinical image-text retrieval. However, this reliance creates a significant attack surface. We propose MedThreatRAG, a novel multimodal poisoning framework that systematically probes vulnerabilities in medical RAG systems by injecting adversarial image-text pairs. A key innovation of our approach is the construction of a simulated semi-open attack environment, mimicking real-world medical systems that permit periodic knowledge base updates via user or pipeline contributions. Within this setting, we introduce and emphasize Cross-Modal Conflict Injection (CMCI), which embeds subtle semantic contradictions between medical images and their paired reports. These mismatches degrade retrieval and generation by disrupting cross-modal alignment while remaining sufficiently plausible to evade conventional filters. While basic textual and visual attacks are included for completeness, CMCI demonstrates the most severe degradation. Evaluations on IU-Xray and MIMIC-CXR QA tasks show that MedThreatRAG reduces answer F1 scores by up to 27.66% and lowers LLaVA-Med-1.5 F1 rates to as low as 51.36%. Our findings expose fundamental security gaps in clinical RAG systems and highlight the urgent need for threat-aware design and robust multimodal consistency checks. Finally, we conclude with a concise set of guidelines to inform the safe development of future multimodal medical RAG systems.