设计激励机制，让玩家在重复博弈中更快达成目标行为。
A Soft Inducement Framework for Incentive-Aided Steering of No-Regret Players
- 先用一次性信息设计构造斯塔克尔伯格博弈，再引导玩家
- 常数级支付下，收敛速度提升一个常数因子
- 适合需快速引导策略的博弈场景或平台设计
本文研究中介增强型双人正常形式博弈中的引导问题，中介通过信息与激励设计引导玩家趋向特定行动组合。我们首先刻画了可行引导的游戏类型，并证明仅靠信息设计或次线性支付方案无法实现任意目标行动组合的引导。因此，我们推导出每轮实现该目标所需的常数支付下限。为克服信息设计的局限性，提出一种增强方法：在重复博弈开始前进行一次性的信息设计，将前期互动转化为斯塔克尔伯格博弈。理论证明该方法在高概率下使玩家行动组合的收敛速率提升一个常数因子，并通过实证结果加以支持。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
In this work, we investigate a steering problem in a mediator-augmented two-player normal-form game, where the mediator aims to guide players toward a specific action profile through information and incentive design. We first characterize the games for which successful steering is possible. Moreover, we establish that steering players to any desired action profile is not always achievable with information design alone, nor when accompanied with sublinear payment schemes. Consequently, we derive a lower bound on the constant payments required per round to achieve this goal. To address these limitations incurred with information design, we introduce an augmented approach that involves a one-shot information design phase before the start of the repeated game, transforming the prior interaction into a Stackelberg game. Finally, we theoretically demonstrate that this approach improves the convergence rate of players' action profiles to the target point by a constant factor with high probability, and support it with empirical results.
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