研究内容平台如何通过设置门槛和奖励机制提升内容质量
Entry Barriers in Content Markets
- 用博弈论分析平台的结构与策略性进入壁垒
- 发现排名与分成奖励会自然形成新旧作者不平等
- 引入入场费并投入奖励池可有效提升整体内容质量
在线内容平台中低质内容泛滥常归因于缺乏有效的进入门槛。本文首次采用博弈论分析两类进入壁垒:一是结构性壁垒,由现有创作者集体行为导致新者不利;二是策略性壁垒,平台主动设入场费以遏制低质贡献者。研究显示,无论采用排名制还是比例分成奖励机制,均会在纳什均衡下产生结构性壁垒。而当平台将部分或全部入场费注入奖励池时,能显著提升整体内容质量。该研究为设计结合入场费与激励机制的平台规则提供了理论依据。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
The prevalence of low-quality content on online platforms is often attributed to the absence of meaningful entry requirements. This motivates us to investigate whether implicit or explicit entry barriers, alongside appropriate reward mechanisms, can enhance content quality. We present the first game-theoretic analysis of two distinct types of entry barriers in online content platforms. The first, a structural barrier, emerges from the collective behaviour of incumbent content providers which disadvantages new entrants. We show that both rank-order and proportional-share reward mechanisms induce such a structural barrier at Nash equilibrium. The second, a strategic barrier, involves the platform proactively imposing entry fees to discourage participation from low-quality contributors. We consider a scheme in which the platform redirects some or all of the entry fees into the reward pool. We formally demonstrate that this approach can improve overall content quality. Our findings establish a theoretical foundation for designing reward mechanisms coupled with entry fees to promote higher-quality content and support healthier online ecosystems.
Thank you to arXiv for use of its open access interoperability. PaperDance 不是 arXiv 官方产品;中文卡片由大模型生成,请以原文为准。