媒体能通过舆论压力推动AI开发者重视安全。
Can Media Act as a Soft Regulator of Safe AI Development? A Game Theoretical Analysis
- 用演化博弈模型模拟开发者与用户互动，分析媒体影响。
- 只有媒体信息可靠且成本适中时，安全AI才能普及。
- 适合关注AI治理与舆论监督的研究者阅读。
当AI开发者在利润与用户安全之间抉择时，往往倾向于利润。不靠谱的AI技术必须伴随实际负面后果。本文将这些后果视为媒体曝光其不当行为后引发的声誉损失。我们构建了自利的开发者与用户人工群体，通过演化博弈理论进行研究。结果表明，媒体确实能促进开发者与用户之间的合作，但并非总是如此。若媒体信息不可靠，或获取媒体信息、确保安全的成本过高，则合作无法形成。通过塑造公众认知并追究开发者责任，媒体成为一种强有力的软性监管机制——即使在缺乏正式政府监管的情况下，也能引导AI向安全方向发展。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
When developers of artificial intelligence (AI) products need to decide between profit and safety for the users, they likely choose profit. Untrustworthy AI technology must come packaged with tangible negative consequences. Here, we envisage those consequences as the loss of reputation caused by media coverage of their misdeeds, disseminated to the public. We explore whether media coverage has the potential to push AI creators into the production of safe products, enabling widespread adoption of AI technology. We created artificial populations of self-interested creators and users and studied them through the lens of evolutionary game theory. Our results reveal that media is indeed able to foster cooperation between creators and users, but not always. Cooperation does not evolve if the quality of the information provided by the media is not reliable enough, or if the costs of either accessing media or ensuring safety are too high. By shaping public perception and holding developers accountable, media emerges as a powerful soft regulator -- guiding AI safety even in the absence of formal government oversight.
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