提出防御联邦学习后门攻击的理论框架，区分大中小偏差攻击并组合防御方法。

Federated Learning (FL) enables distributed model training but is vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious clients embed attacker-controlled behaviors into the global model. Existing defenses fail against adaptive adversaries. In this paper, we present "Hammer and Anvil", a principled theoretical framework that categorizes backdoors by the deviation, $δ$, of their updates to the mean of the updates. We identify two fundamental defense types: "Type 1 (The Anvil)", comprising outlier detection and robust aggregation effective against large-deviation attacks, and "Type 2 (The Hammer)", consisting of removal-based defenses effective against small-deviation attacks. We demonstrate that defenses of a single type and non-principled combined defenses inherently leave an exploitable gap for adaptive attackers. To bridge this gap, we propose the principled combination of Type 1 and Type 2 defenses. We evaluate our framework against a new, worst-case, full-information adaptive adversary that knows the benign updates, the aggregation algorithm, and its parameters, and yet this adversary fails against our combined defenses. Our empirical evaluation across various datasets and settings shows that single-typed and non-principled combined defenses are easily broken, often by a single malicious client. In contrast, our best combined defense variants, $HA_{Flame}^{CSFT}$, $HA_{Krum}^{CSFT}$, and $HA_{Multi-Metrics}^{CSFT}$, remain undefeated even in the most adversarial settings. Our results provide a principled approach for research on backdoors in federated learning.