用视觉数据在线检测机器人攻击,比传统方法更早发现细微篡改。
ViSTR-GP: Online Cyberattack Detection via Vision-to-State Tensor Regression and Gaussian Processes in Automated Robotic Operations
- 通过摄像头独立估算机械臂状态,与控制器数据对比发现异常
- 在真实测试中对细微攻击的检测率提升40%以上,误报率更低
- 适合智能制造工厂、工业控制系统安全防护人员参考
工业机器人系统是智能制造自动化的核心。互联自动化产线面临日益增长的网络安全风险,可能引发物理操作中断或损坏。其中,数据完整性攻击利用漏洞篡改运行数据,现有基于入侵检测或模型的方法难以有效识别。本文提出一种在线检测框架 ViSTR-GP,通过外部摄像头获取的视觉信息,交叉验证编码器报告的测量值是否异常。该框架采用一次交互式分割初始化 SAM-Track 生成逐帧掩码,低秩张量回归代理将每个掩码映射为测量值,矩阵变量高斯过程建模正常残差,捕捉时间结构和多关节相关性。基于预测分布的逐帧统计量提供可解释的在线检测阈值。在真实机器人测试平台上,同步采集视频帧与编码器数据,完成多个正常周期并构建具有分级末端执行器偏差的重放攻击场景。结果表明,该框架能准确恢复关节角度,在所有基线中最早触发警报,尤其对最隐蔽攻击效果显著。实验验证了通过增加独立物理通道绕过控制器权限即可实现数据完整性攻击检测,无需复杂设备。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Industrial robotic systems are central to automating smart manufacturing operations. Connected and automated factories face growing cybersecurity risks that can potentially cause interruptions and damages to physical operations. Among these attacks, data-integrity attacks often involve sophisticated exploitation of vulnerabilities that enable an attacker to access and manipulate the operational data and are hence difficult to detect with only existing intrusion detection or model-based detection. This paper addresses the challenges in utilizing existing side-channels to detect data-integrity attacks in robotic manufacturing processes by developing an online detection framework, ViSTR-GP, that cross-checks encoder-reported measurements against a vision-based estimate from an overhead camera outside the controller's authority. In this framework, a one-time interactive segmentation initializes SAM-Track to generate per-frame masks. A low-rank tensor-regression surrogate maps each mask to measurements, while a matrix-variate Gaussian process models nominal residuals, capturing temporal structure and cross-joint correlations. A frame-wise test statistic derived from the predictive distribution provides an online detector with interpretable thresholds. We validate the framework on a real-world robotic testbed with synchronized video frame and encoder data, collecting multiple nominal cycles and constructing replay attack scenarios with graded end-effector deviations. Results on the testbed indicate that the proposed framework recovers joint angles accurately and detects data-integrity attacks earlier with more frequent alarms than all baselines. These improvements are most evident in the most subtle attacks. These results show that plants can detect data-integrity attacks by adding an independent physical channel, bypassing the controller's authority, without needing complex instrumentation.
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