通过预测误差检测表格数据生成模型的成员信息泄露。
MIA-EPT: Membership Inference Attack via Error Prediction for Tabular Data
- 用属性掩码与重构构建误差特征向量,探测记录是否在训练集中。
- 在多个扩散模型上实现最高0.599的AUC-ROC,TPR@10% FPR达22.0%。
- 黑盒攻击,无需模型内部信息,适合隐私安全研究者使用。
合成数据生成在医疗、金融等敏感领域促进数据共享中扮演关键角色。近期扩散模型使高保真表格数据生成成为可能,但可能记忆训练记录并泄露敏感信息。成员推理攻击(MIA)利用此漏洞判断某条记录是否用于训练。尽管图像与文本领域已有相关研究,针对表格扩散模型的MIA仍缺乏探索,尤其面临结构化属性和样本多样性有限的特殊风险。本文提出MIA-EPT:一种专为表格扩散模型设计的新型黑盒攻击方法。该方法通过掩码与重构目标记录的属性,构建基于误差的特征向量,依据属性预测精度揭示成员信号。MIA-EPT无需访问生成模型内部组件,仅依赖其输出的合成数据,在三种基于扩散的合成器上验证有效,内部测试中达到最高0.599的AUC-ROC与22.0%的TPR@10% FPR。在MIDST 2025竞赛的黑盒多表赛道中,取得第二名成绩(TPR@10% FPR = 20.0%)。结果表明,该方法能有效发现合成表格数据中的显著成员泄露,挑战了合成数据天然具备隐私保护性的假设。代码已开源:https://github.com/eyalgerman/MIA-EPT。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Synthetic data generation plays an important role in enabling data sharing, particularly in sensitive domains like healthcare and finance. Recent advances in diffusion models have made it possible to generate realistic, high-quality tabular data, but they may also memorize training records and leak sensitive information. Membership inference attacks (MIAs) exploit this vulnerability by determining whether a record was used in training. While MIAs have been studied in images and text, their use against tabular diffusion models remains underexplored despite the unique risks of structured attributes and limited record diversity. In this paper, we introduce MIAEPT, Membership Inference Attack via Error Prediction for Tabular Data, a novel black-box attack specifically designed to target tabular diffusion models. MIA-EPT constructs errorbased feature vectors by masking and reconstructing attributes of target records, disclosing membership signals based on how well these attributes are predicted. MIA-EPT operates without access to the internal components of the generative model, relying only on its synthetic data output, and was shown to generalize across multiple state-of-the-art diffusion models. We validate MIA-EPT on three diffusion-based synthesizers, achieving AUC-ROC scores of up to 0.599 and TPR@10% FPR values of 22.0% in our internal tests. Under the MIDST 2025 competition conditions, MIA-EPT achieved second place in the Black-box Multi-Table track (TPR@10% FPR = 20.0%). These results demonstrate that our method can uncover substantial membership leakage in synthetic tabular data, challenging the assumption that synthetic data is inherently privacy-preserving. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/eyalgerman/MIA-EPT.
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