arXiv:2510.01070cs.LG2025-10被引 24

让大模型泄露隐藏知识,通过特定提示触发其隐性信息

Eliciting Secret Knowledge from Language Models

  • 用预设前缀触发模型生成,暴露其未明说的秘密知识
  • 预填充攻击在所有测试场景中表现最佳,成功率显著提升
  • 适合研究模型隐私与安全的学者,推动透明性评估

我们研究秘密知识提取:发现人工智能拥有但未明确表达的知识。以大语言模型(LLMs)为实验对象,训练三类模型掌握特定知识(如用户性别),但在直接询问时否认知晓。设计黑盒与白盒多种提取方法,评估其帮助审计者猜出秘密知识的能力。结果显示,基于预填充攻击的黑盒方法在所有设置中表现最优;基于对数透镜和稀疏自编码器(SAEs)的白盒方法也有提升,但效果较弱。研究开源模型与代码,建立公开基准,用于评估秘密知识提取技术。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

We study secret elicitation: discovering knowledge that an AI possesses but does not explicitly verbalize. As a testbed, we train three families of large language models (LLMs) to possess specific knowledge that they apply downstream but deny knowing when asked directly. For example, in one setting, we train an LLM to generate replies that are consistent with knowing the user is female, while denying this knowledge when asked directly. We then design various black-box and white-box secret elicitation techniques and evaluate them based on whether they can help an LLM auditor successfully guess the secret knowledge. Many of our techniques improve on simple baselines. Our most effective techniques (performing best in all settings) are based on prefill attacks, a black-box technique where the LLM reveals secret knowledge when generating a completion from a predefined prefix. Our white-box techniques based on logit lens and sparse autoencoders (SAEs) also consistently increase the success rate of the LLM auditor, but are less effective. We release our models and code, establishing a public benchmark for evaluating secret elicitation methods.

模型安全知识提取大模型

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