攻击者可通过分词器推断数据是否被用于大模型训练，暴露隐私风险。

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are widely used to assess the privacy risks associated with machine learning models. However, when these attacks are applied to pre-trained large language models (LLMs), they encounter significant challenges, including mislabeled samples, distribution shifts, and discrepancies in model size between experimental and real-world settings. To address these limitations, we introduce tokenizers as a new attack vector for membership inference. Specifically, a tokenizer converts raw text into tokens for LLMs. Unlike full models, tokenizers can be efficiently trained from scratch, thereby avoiding the aforementioned challenges. In addition, the tokenizer's training data is typically representative of the data used to pre-train LLMs. Despite these advantages, the potential of tokenizers as an attack vector remains unexplored. To this end, we present the first study on membership leakage through tokenizers and explore five attack methods to infer dataset membership. Extensive experiments on millions of Internet samples reveal the vulnerabilities in the tokenizers of state-of-the-art LLMs. To mitigate this emerging risk, we further propose an adaptive defense. Our findings highlight tokenizers as an overlooked yet critical privacy threat, underscoring the urgent need for privacy-preserving mechanisms specifically designed for them.