首份系统综述揭示智能体安全的应用、威胁与防御全貌
A Survey on Agentic Security: Applications, Threats and Defenses
- 按应用-威胁-防御三支柱构建260篇论文的分类体系
- 发现智能体系统天生脆弱,需全生命周期防御而非单一措施
- 适合关注AI安全、自动化攻防的研究者与从业者阅读
基于大语言模型的智能体已广泛应用于网络安全领域。尽管其自主性提升了安全应用能力,但也带来了新的攻击面,安全界正积极构建防御机制。然而该领域文献快速增长且不均衡,现有综述多孤立讨论应用、威胁与防御,缺乏对三者关联性的统一分析。本文首次提出完整的智能体安全全景综述,围绕应用、威胁与防御三大支柱组织内容,涵盖超过260篇论文。系统梳理智能体在下游安全任务中的使用方式,剖析其内在威胁,归纳针对性防御措施。进一步提供各支柱内部及跨支柱分析,包括安全生命周期覆盖情况、红队与蓝队智能体对比、红队工具的恶意滥用等。在威胁层面,分析攻击入口与智能体循环阶段的靶点,及其在智能体场景下的特异性与假设的威胁模型。在防御层面,评估主流策略的成本与安全性权衡,以及其在智能体生命周期中的部署位置。还映射了各类防御对攻击类型的覆盖范围,并追踪智能体架构、基础模型使用、数据模态覆盖及攻防研究增长趋势。综合结果表明,智能体系统默认结构脆弱,需覆盖全生命周期的防御体系,而非单层修复。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
LLM-based agents are now used throughout cybersecurity. While these agents facilitate powerful and autonomous security applications, their autonomy opens up new attack surfaces, and the security community is actively building defenses to secure them. Yet the literature on this subject has grown quickly and unevenly. Existing surveys treat applications, threats, and defenses in isolation, leaving no unified account of how an agent's capabilities, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures interconnect. In this work we present the first holistic survey of the agentic security landscape, structuring the field around the fundamental pillars of Applications, Threats and Defenses. We provide a comprehensive taxonomy of over 260 papers, explaining how agents are used in downstream cybersecurity applications, inherent threats to agentic systems, and countermeasures designed to protect them. In addition, we provide detailed pillar-specific and cross-cutting analyses that show the security-lifecycle coverage of agentic applications, comparison between red-teaming and blue-teaming agents, and the adversarial use of red-teaming applications. On the threat side, we analyze the entry points and agent-loop stages that attacks target, their specificity to the agentic setting, and the threat models they assume. On the defense side, we analyze the prevailing defense strategies, their cost and security trade-offs, and where in the agent lifecycle they are deployed. We further map which defenses cover which attack classes and chart trends in agent architecture, backbone model usage, data modality coverage, and the growth of attack and defense research over time. Taken together, these findings indicate that agentic systems are structurally fragile by default and that securing them will require defenses that span the full agent lifecycle rather than single-layer fixes.
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