人类不把AI的讽刺话当有意为之，神经反应也更弱。

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as social agents and trained to produce humor and irony, a question emerges: when encountering witty AI remarks, do people interpret them as deliberate communicative acts? This study investigated whether people adopt an intentional stance, ascribing mental states to explain behavior, when comprehending AI-attributed irony. Irony provides a testbed because understanding it requires distinguishing intentional contradictions from unintended errors through pragmatic reanalysis. Using electroencephalography (EEG) to measure event-related potentials (ERPs), we compared behavioral and neural responses to identical ironic utterances attributed to either an AI companion or a human. We found that people do not fully adopt an intentional stance towards AI communication. Participants interpreted contextually incongruent utterances as irony significantly less often when attributed to an AI than when attributed to a human. Correspondingly, we observed attenuated neural responses to AI-attributed irony compared to human-attributed irony during both initial semantic processing (P200) and pragmatic reanalysis (P600). In addition, these neural responses were modulated by individual perceptions of AI sincerity and trustworthiness, with positive perceptions facilitating pragmatic comprehension by reducing cognitive effort. This suggests that adopting an intentional stance toward AI is a flexible and adaptive process, dynamically shaped by people's mental models of artificial agents. These findings reveal that despite advances in communicative competence, AI systems face a barrier to social agency: humans process input from artificial interlocutors with reduced ascription of intentionality. This has important implications for understanding human social cognition and for designing AI systems intended for social interaction.