区分策略的一阶、高阶与共同知识，揭示其在博弈与共识中的关键作用。
Knowledge and Common Knowledge of Strategies
- 提出细粒度策略知识模型，可区分一阶、高阶与共同知识
- 在汉诺比游戏中验证高阶知识对策略的影响
- 证明共同知识是解决共识问题的必要条件
现有策略推理研究多采用知情或不知情语义。本文提出一种可细粒度指定策略知识的模型，能区分一阶、高阶与共同知识。通过分析汉诺比游戏，展示高阶知识对策略的影响；进一步证明，解决共识问题必须依赖共同知识。最后研究了该模型的模型检测问题的可判定性。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Most existing work on strategic reasoning simply adopts either an informed or an uninformed semantics. We propose a model where knowledge of strategies can be specified on a fine-grained level. In particular, it is possible to distinguish first-order, higher-order, and common knowledge of strategies. We illustrate the effect of higher-order knowledge of strategies by studying the game Hanabi. Further, we show that common knowledge of strategies is necessary to solve the consensus problem. Finally, we study the decidability of the model checking problem.
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