对比两种差分隐私方法在联邦学习中的抗梯度泄露能力
Differential Privacy: Gradient Leakage Attacks in Federated Learning Environments
- 用DP-SGD和PDP-SGD防御梯度泄露攻击
- DP-SGD显著降低泄露风险,模型性能略有下降
- PDP-SGD虽保性能却难防数据重建,不实用
联邦学习(FL)可在不共享敏感数据的情况下协同训练机器学习模型,但仍面临梯度泄露攻击(GLAs)风险,可能暴露私有信息。本文研究差分隐私(DP)机制——特别是DP-SGD及其基于显式正则化的变体PDP-SGD——作为防御手段的有效性。我们在一个简单的分类任务上,在不同隐私水平下评估多个计算机视觉模型的性能,并在模拟的联邦学习环境中分析从截获梯度中重建私有数据的质量。结果表明,DP-SGD能显著缓解梯度泄露风险,但存在适度的模型效用损失;而PDP-SGD虽保持较强的分类性能,但在实际中无法有效防范重建攻击。这凸显了在分布式学习场景中,仅依赖理论保证不足以评估隐私机制,必须通过实证检验其对信息泄露的实际防护能力。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Federated Learning (FL) allows for the training of Machine Learning models in a collaborative manner without the need to share sensitive data. However, it remains vulnerable to Gradient Leakage Attacks (GLAs), which can reveal private information from the shared model updates. In this work, we investigate the effectiveness of Differential Privacy (DP) mechanisms - specifically, DP-SGD and a variant based on explicit regularization (PDP-SGD) - as defenses against GLAs. To this end, we evaluate the performance of several computer vision models trained under varying privacy levels on a simple classification task, and then analyze the quality of private data reconstructions obtained from the intercepted gradients in a simulated FL environment. Our results demonstrate that DP-SGD significantly mitigates the risk of gradient leakage attacks, albeit with a moderate trade-off in model utility. In contrast, PDP-SGD maintains strong classification performance but proves ineffective as a practical defense against reconstruction attacks. These findings highlight the importance of empirically evaluating privacy mechanisms beyond their theoretical guarantees, particularly in distributed learning scenarios where information leakage may represent an unassumable critical threat to data security and privacy.
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