用《大富翁卡牌》构建博弈基准,研究单向有限回应机制。
Monopoly Deal: A Benchmark Environment for Bounded One-Sided Response Games
- 设计《大富翁卡牌》变体,模拟一方出招后对方限时应对的机制。
- 用CFR算法训练出高效策略,无需新算法改进。
- 提供可玩网页版与开源代码,适合博弈研究与算法测试。
卡牌游戏广泛用于研究不确定环境下的顺序决策,其现实对应包括谈判、金融和网络安全。这些游戏通常分为三类:严格轮流(玩家交替执行单步动作)、确定性回应(某些动作触发固定结果)以及无界互应(允许持续对抗)。一种较少研究但战略丰富的结构是受限单向回应,即一方出招后短暂移交控制权给对手,对手必须通过一至多个动作满足特定条件后回合才结束。我们称此类机制为受限单向回应游戏(BORGs)。本文提出一个改良版《大富翁卡牌》作为基准环境,聚焦这一动态——‘租金’行动迫使对手选择支付资产。黄金标准算法反事实遗憾最小化(CFR)在不引入新算法扩展的情况下收敛到有效策略。同时构建了一个轻量级全栈研究平台,集成环境、并行化CFR运行时及可交互网页界面。训练好的CFR代理与源码已公开于https://monopolydeal.ai。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.
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