攻击者通过恶意软件窃取机器人安全密钥，实现对自动驾驶系统的伪装控制。
Supply Chain Exploitation of Secure ROS 2 Systems: A Proof-of-Concept on Autonomous Platform Compromise via Keystore Exfiltration
- 在Debian包中植入木马，窃取ROS 2生成的安全密钥并通过DNS外传
- 利用窃取密钥可伪装成合法节点，成功注入伪造控制或感知消息
- 适用于所有使用SROS 2的机器人系统，适合安全研究人员参考
本文针对安全版ROS 2（SROS 2）框架提出一种供应链攻击的验证性案例，实验平台为Quanser QCar2自动驾驶车辆。恶意感染的Debian包修改核心ROS 2安全命令，将新生成的密钥库凭证以base64编码分块形式通过DNS发送至攻击者控制的域名服务器。获取这些凭证后，攻击者可作为已认证节点重新加入SROS 2网络，并发布未被识别的伪造控制或感知消息。我们在配置有Intel RealSense相机的SROS 2 Humble测试环境中验证该能力，执行四路口标志物导航任务。实验结果表明，控制主题注入可引发强制刹车、持续高速加速及循环转向；感知主题欺骗可制造虚假停车标志或屏蔽真实检测。该攻击可推广至任何基于DDS且使用SROS 2的机器人系统，凸显了保障供应链完整性和运行时语义验证的必要性，以防范内部威胁与身份冒用。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
This paper presents a proof-of-concept supply chain attack against the Secure ROS 2 (SROS 2) framework, demonstrated on a Quanser QCar2 autonomous vehicle platform. A Trojan-infected Debian package modifies core ROS 2 security commands to exfiltrate newly generated keystore credentials via DNS in base64-encoded chunks to an attacker-controlled nameserver. Possession of these credentials enables the attacker to rejoin the SROS 2 network as an authenticated participant and publish spoofed control or perception messages without triggering authentication failures. We evaluate this capability on a secure ROS 2 Humble testbed configured for a four-stop-sign navigation routine using an Intel RealSense camera for perception. Experimental results show that control-topic injections can cause forced braking, sustained high-speed acceleration, and continuous turning loops, while perception-topic spoofing can induce phantom stop signs or suppress real detections. The attack generalizes to any data distribution service (DDS)-based robotic system using SROS 2, highlighting the need for both supply chain integrity controls and runtime semantic validation to safeguard autonomous systems against insider and impersonation threats.
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