通过重建隐空间触发变化,精准识别并清除后门攻击。
Robust Backdoor Removal by Reconstructing Trigger-Activated Changes in Latent Representation
- 用凸二次规划求解最小扰动,更准确估计触发激活差异。
- 在多个数据集和模型上,后门抑制率超现有方法,干净数据精度高。
- 适合研究后门防御或模型安全的工程师与研究人员使用。
后门攻击威胁机器学习模型安全,使模型在干净数据上表现正常,却将污染数据错误分类至指定类。现有防御方法依赖触发激活差异(TAC)识别后门神经元,但因TAC估计不准导致精度低。本文提出新方法:将迫使干净数据误分类的最小扰动建模为凸二次优化问题,其最优解作为TAC的代理。通过检测扰动的$ L^2 $范数小值识别污染类别,并利用该类别扰动进行微调以移除后门。在CIFAR-10、GTSRB和TinyImageNet上的实验表明,本方法在不同攻击类型、数据集和架构下均显著优于现有防御,实现优异的后门抑制与高干净准确率。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Backdoor attacks pose a critical threat to machine learning models, causing them to behave normally on clean data but misclassify poisoned data into a poisoned class. Existing defenses often attempt to identify and remove backdoor neurons based on Trigger-Activated Changes (TAC) which is the activation differences between clean and poisoned data. These methods suffer from low precision in identifying true backdoor neurons due to inaccurate estimation of TAC values. In this work, we propose a novel backdoor removal method by accurately reconstructing TAC values in the latent representation. Specifically, we formulate the minimal perturbation that forces clean data to be classified into a specific class as a convex quadratic optimization problem, whose optimal solution serves as a surrogate for TAC. We then identify the poisoned class by detecting statistically small $L^2$ norms of perturbations and leverage the perturbation of the poisoned class in fine-tuning to remove backdoors. Experiments on CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and TinyImageNet demonstrated that our approach consistently achieves superior backdoor suppression with high clean accuracy across different attack types, datasets, and architectures, outperforming existing defense methods.
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