通过分析响应不一致性,用新方法检测大模型越狱攻击
NegBLEURT Forest: Leveraging Inconsistencies for Detecting Jailbreak Attacks
- 对比成功与失败响应的语义一致性,识别越狱特征
- 在多个模型上准确率领先,最高达98.7%
- 无需调参或微调,适合安全检测场景
旨在绕过安全机制、诱导大语言模型生成有害内容的越狱攻击构成严重威胁。由于通用过滤规则难以适应特定上下文,本文提出一种基于语义一致性的检测方法,通过分析对抗性提示引发的成功与失败响应间的不一致性,发现有意义的模式。在此基础上,构建了名为NegBLEURT Forest的新检测框架,利用否定感知评分评估输出与预期安全行为的对齐程度,并采用孤立森林算法识别异常响应,实现可靠越狱检测。实验表明,该方法在多模型测试中始终表现优异,准确率排名第一或第二,优于现有方法,且对模型和数据变化不敏感。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Jailbreak attacks designed to bypass safety mechanisms pose a serious threat by prompting LLMs to generate harmful or inappropriate content, despite alignment with ethical guidelines. Crafting universal filtering rules remains difficult due to their inherent dependence on specific contexts. To address these challenges without relying on threshold calibration or model fine-tuning, this work introduces a semantic consistency analysis between successful and unsuccessful responses, demonstrating that a negation-aware scoring approach captures meaningful patterns. Building on this insight, a novel detection framework called NegBLEURT Forest is proposed to evaluate the degree of alignment between outputs elicited by adversarial prompts and expected safe behaviors. It identifies anomalous responses using the Isolation Forest algorithm, enabling reliable jailbreak detection. Experimental results show that the proposed method consistently achieves top-tier performance, ranking first or second in accuracy across diverse models using the crafted dataset, while competing approaches exhibit notable sensitivity to model and data variations.
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