提出可复现的医疗AI安全评估框架，支持普通设备测试隐私与越狱漏洞。

Medical Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for clinical decision support across diverse specialties, yet systematic evaluation of their robustness to adversarial misuse and privacy leakage remains inaccessible to most researchers. Existing security benchmarks require GPU clusters, commercial API access, or protected health data -- barriers that limit community participation in this critical research area. We propose a practical, fully reproducible framework for evaluating medical AI security under realistic resource constraints. Our framework design covers multiple medical specialties stratified by clinical risk -- from high-risk domains such as emergency medicine and psychiatry to general practice -- addressing jailbreaking attacks (role-playing, authority impersonation, multi-turn manipulation) and privacy extraction attacks. All evaluation utilizes synthetic patient records requiring no IRB approval. The framework is designed to run entirely on consumer CPU hardware using freely available models, eliminating cost barriers. We present the framework specification including threat models, data generation methodology, evaluation protocols, and scoring rubrics. This proposal establishes a foundation for comparative security assessment of medical-specialist models and defense mechanisms, advancing the broader goal of ensuring safe and trustworthy medical AI systems.