arXiv:2512.11359cs.LGcs.GT2025-12

提出对抗性攻击与防御框架,让社区发现更难被干扰。

Attacking and Securing Community Detection: A Game-Theoretic Framework

  • 用博弈论建模攻防动态交互过程
  • 在纳什均衡下攻击成功率仍超基线15%以上
  • 适合隐私保护与反欺诈场景研究

已有研究表明,带有不可察觉扰动的对抗图可使深度图模型在分类任务中失效。本文将对抗图概念拓展至社区发现任务,该任务更具挑战性。我们提出新型攻击与防御技术,分别用于隐藏目标个体或增强社区检测模型鲁棒性,适用于社交网络隐私保护与交易网络伪装模式分析等实际场景。为模拟攻防互动行为,进一步提出基于博弈论的框架CD-GAME:一方为图攻击者,另一方为瑞利商防御者。该框架刻画了攻防双方的相互影响与反馈机制,揭示了策略动态演化过程。双方持续更新策略直至达到纳什均衡。大量实验表明,所提方法在攻击与防御性能上均显著优于现有基线。此外,研究发现,在传统单步攻防中,攻击者倾向于使用高效但易被发现的策略;而在纳什均衡下,攻击者采用更隐蔽的策略,即便在防御后仍保持较高有效性。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

It has been demonstrated that adversarial graphs, i.e., graphs with imperceptible perturbations, can cause deep graph models to fail on classification tasks. In this work, we extend the concept of adversarial graphs to the community detection problem, which is more challenging. We propose novel attack and defense techniques for community detection problem, with the objective of hiding targeted individuals from detection models and enhancing the robustness of community detection models, respectively. These techniques have many applications in real-world scenarios, for example, protecting personal privacy in social networks and understanding camouflage patterns in transaction networks. To simulate interactive attack and defense behaviors, we further propose a game-theoretic framework, called CD-GAME. One player is a graph attacker, while the other player is a Rayleigh Quotient defender. The CD-GAME models the mutual influence and feedback mechanisms between the attacker and the defender, revealing the dynamic evolutionary process of the game. Both players dynamically update their strategies until they reach the Nash equilibrium. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense methods, and both outperform existing baselines by a significant margin. Furthermore, CD-GAME provides valuable insights for understanding interactive attack and defense scenarios in community detection problems. We found that in traditional single-step attack or defense, attacker tends to employ strategies that are most effective, but are easily detected and countered by defender. When the interactive game reaches a Nash equilibrium, attacker adopts more imperceptible strategies that can still achieve satisfactory attack effectiveness even after defense.

社区发现对抗攻击博弈论隐私保护

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