用跨轴Transformer破解椭圆曲线密码,挑战现有加密安全假设。
Mage: Cracking Elliptic Curve Cryptography with Cross-Axis Transformers
- 将语言模型架构应用于逆向推导公钥生成过程,尝试破解椭圆曲线密码。
- 实验证明模型可记忆secp256r1密钥对并反推私钥,揭示潜在安全风险。
- 为密码学安全性评估提供新思路,适合关注密码安全与机器学习交叉的研究者。
随着机器学习和量子计算的发展,21世纪的算法安全性正面临前所未有的挑战。现代密码学如椭圆曲线密码(ECC)是当前网络安全协议的核心,广泛应用于HTTPS、比特币等场景。然而,针对这些算法的安全性测试极为有限,仅有少数研究聚焦于侧信道攻击。尽管人们普遍认为这些算法坚不可摧,但实际漏洞已存在。随着计算能力与分布式计算的提升,现有加密体系可能很快失效。本文探索利用现代语言模型架构,从已知公钥逆向推导私钥,通过学习公钥生成机制来破解椭圆曲线。同时,我们检验了机器学习模型对secp256r1密钥对的记忆能力及其反推生成过程的能力。结果表明,此类方法在特定条件下具备潜在威胁。最后,我们展望了该领域未来发展方向。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
With the advent of machine learning and quantum computing, the 21st century has gone from a place of relative algorithmic security, to one of speculative unease and possibly, cyber catastrophe. Modern algorithms like Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are the bastion of current cryptographic security protocols that form the backbone of consumer protection ranging from Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) in the modern internet browser, to cryptographic financial instruments like Bitcoin. And there's been very little work put into testing the strength of these ciphers. Practically the only study that I could find was on side-channel recognition, a joint paper from the University of Milan, Italy and King's College, London\cite{battistello2025ecc}. These algorithms are already considered bulletproof by many consumers, but exploits already exist for them, and with computing power and distributed, federated compute on the rise, it's only a matter of time before these current bastions fade away into obscurity, and it's on all of us to stand up when we notice something is amiss, lest we see such passages claim victims in that process. In this paper, we seek to explore the use of modern language model architecture in cracking the association between a known public key, and its associated private key, by intuitively learning to reverse engineer the public keypair generation process, effectively solving the curve. Additonally, we attempt to ascertain modern machine learning's ability to memorize public-private secp256r1 keypairs, and to then test their ability to reverse engineer the public keypair generation process. It is my belief that proof-for would be equally valuable as proof-against in either of these categories. Finally, we'll conclude with some number crunching on where we see this particular field heading in the future.
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