arXiv:2601.06305cs.CL2026-01ACL被引 3

LoRA难删后门,新方法通过增强谱强度和对齐来提升遗忘能力

Why LoRA Fails to Forget: Regularized Low-Rank Adaptation Against Backdoors in Language Models

  • 通过正则化与谱重缩放增强更新的谱强度和方向对齐
  • 在多个任务上将攻击成功率大幅降低,同时保持干净数据准确率
  • 适合关注模型安全、后门防御的研究者和工程师

低秩适应(LoRA)被广泛用于大语言模型的参数高效微调,但在使用干净数据微调被污染的预训练模型时,难以消除后门行为。我们发现,这一弱点并非源于低秩本身,而是根本性的谱特性问题:LoRA更新的奇异值远低于预训练权重,且谱方向对齐不佳——弱匹配清洁任务方向,却仍保留与触发敏感子空间的重叠。我们进一步确立了理论上的关键缩放阈值,超过该阈值时洛拉理论上可抑制触发激活,但标准洛拉极少达到此范围。为此提出正则化低秩适应(RoRA),通过清洁数据强化正则、触发无关约束及训练后谱重缩放,提升谱强度并纠正对齐。在多个NLP基准和攻击设置下的实验表明,RoRA显著降低攻击成功率,同时维持干净准确率。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) is widely used for parameter-efficient fine-tuning of large language models, but it is notably ineffective at removing backdoor behaviors from poisoned pretrained models when fine-tuning on clean dataset. Contrary to the common belief that this weakness is caused primarily by low rank, we show that LoRA's vulnerability is fundamentally spectral. Our analysis identifies two key factors: LoRA updates (i) possess insufficient spectral strength, with singular values far below those of pretrained weights, and (ii) exhibit unfavorable spectral alignment, weakly matching clean-task directions while retaining overlap with trigger-sensitive subspaces. We further establish a critical scaling threshold beyond which LoRA can theoretically suppress trigger-induced activations, and we show empirically that standard LoRA rarely reaches this regime. We introduce Regularized Low-Rank Adaptation (RoRA), which improves forgetting by increasing spectral strength and correcting alignment through clean-strengthened regularization, trigger-insensitive constraints, and post-training spectral rescaling. Experiments across multiple NLP benchmarks and attack settings show that RoRA substantially reduces attack success rates while maintaining clean accuracy.

后门防御LoRA模型安全

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