研究多人协作中奖问题在对抗干扰下的通信策略与验证机制。

We study cooperative stochastic multi-armed bandits with vector-valued rewards under adversarial corruption and limited verification. In each of $T$ rounds, each of $N$ agents selects an arm, the environment generates a clean reward vector, and an adversary perturbs the observed feedback subject to a global corruption budget $Γ$. Performance is measured by team regret under a coordinate-wise nondecreasing, $L$-Lipschitz scalarization $ϕ$, covering linear, Chebyshev, and smooth monotone utilities. Our main contribution is a communication-corruption coupling: we show that a fixed environment-side budget $Γ$ can translate into an effective corruption level ranging from $Γ$ to $NΓ$, depending on whether agents share raw samples, sufficient statistics, or only arm recommendations. We formalize this via a protocol-induced multiplicity functional and prove regret bounds parameterized by the resulting effective corruption. As corollaries, raw-sample sharing can suffer an $N$-fold larger additive corruption penalty, whereas summary sharing and recommendation-only sharing preserve an unamplified $O(Γ)$ term and achieve centralized-rate team regret. We further establish information-theoretic limits, including an unavoidable additive $Ω(Γ)$ penalty and a high-corruption regime $Γ=Θ(NT)$ where sublinear regret is impossible without clean information. Finally, we characterize how a global budget $ν$ of verified observations restores learnability. That is, verification is necessary in the high-corruption regime, and sufficient once it crosses the identification threshold, with certified sharing enabling the team's regret to become independent of $Γ$.