AI创作越来越被认可，但无需有意图也能算有创造力。
Creativity Reconsidered: Generative AI and the Problem of Intentional Agency
- 用创意能力替代有意图的创造，解释人类如何评价AI创作
- 发现公众越来越把创造力归于生成式AI，趋势明显上升
- 适合关注人工智能伦理与创造力哲学的读者
许多理论认为，有意识的意图性代理是创造力的必要条件。我们提出，这一标准——称为意图性代理条件（IAC）——应被放弃。我们通过指出生成式AI在缺乏意图性代理的情况下仍被视为具有创造力，来支持这一观点。本文进行了两次语料库分析，揭示人们将创造力归于生成式AI的趋势正在迅速上升。面对这一困境，创造力理论家提出了多种相互矛盾的解决方案，我们对这些方案进行了批判性评估，发现均未能令人满意地解决原初问题。因此，我们提出一种新方法：创造力的归属取决于我们称之为‘创意能力’的属性。该方法解释了为何意图感知在创造力判断中至关重要，却无需将其作为必要条件。此观点既包容了AI的创造力，又保留了人类直觉中意图的重要性。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Many theorists maintain that conscious intentional agency is a necessary condition of creativity. We argue that this requirement, which we call the Intentional Agency Condition (IAC), should be abandoned. We motivate this by highlighting the problems this criterion encounters in the face of recent advances in generative AI, which is ostensibly creative despite being incapable of intentional agency. We present two corpus analyses to illustrate the rapidly increasing tendency of people to predicate creativity to generative AI. In response to this predicament, theorists of creativity have proposed a range of conflicting solutions, which we critically evaluate. We find that none of these satisfyingly resolves the initial predicament, and we therefore propose a novel approach. Our claim is that ascriptions of creativity are dependent on what we call creative ability. This solution explains why intentional agency is important for judgements of creativity, without being a necessary condition. Our approach thereby accommodates AI creativity without dismissing the intuition that perceived intentions are of key importance for ascriptions of creativity.
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