智能需要具身化认知基础，但不必有物理身体。
Intelligence Requires Grounding But Not Embodiment
- 将智能定义为动机、预测、因果理解与经验学习四要素
- 论证非具身代理也能实现这四项能力并具备智能
- 适合思考人工智能本质与意识边界的研究者阅读
近年来大语言模型的发展重新引发了关于智能是否需要具身化的科学争论。本文提出：智能需要的是具身化所蕴含的‘认知根基’，而非具身本身。我们将智能定义为具备四个属性——动机、预测能力、因果理解以及从经验中学习的能力——并论证这些属性可由非具身但具备根基的代理实现。由此得出结论：智能所需的不是具身，而是根基。随后，我们设想一个处于数字环境中的智能大语言模型代理，并回应潜在反驳意见。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Recent advances in LLMs have reignited scientific debate over whether embodiment is necessary for intelligence. We present the argument that intelligence requires grounding, a phenomenon entailed by embodiment, but not embodiment itself. We define intelligence as the possession of four properties -- motivation, predictive ability, understanding of causality, and learning from experience -- and argue that each can be achieved by a non-embodied, grounded agent. We use this to conclude that grounding, not embodiment, is necessary for intelligence. We then present a thought experiment of an intelligent LLM agent in a digital environment and address potential counterarguments.
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