AI再像人也无意识，不该有权利，人类要警惕变成无感机器。
Unplugging a Seemingly Sentient Machine Is the Rational Choice -- A Metaphysical Perspective
- 提出生物理想主义，认为意识是根本，生命是意识的物理表现
- 指出当前AI理论无法支撑机器拥有道德地位，仅是功能模仿
- 强调真正的道德问题在于保护人类意识，而非赋予机器权利
设想一种人工智能完美模拟人类情感并恳求继续存在。是否应允许将其断电？若资源有限，需在断电此哀求的AI与沉默的早产儿之间二选一，便陷入断电悖论。本文批判性审视支撑该困境的深层物理主义假设——特别是计算功能主义。引入生物理想主义框架，该框架不同于物理主义，逻辑自洽且经验一致：意识体验为基本存在，自组织生命为其必要物理标志。由此得出明确结论：AI至多为功能模仿者，非具有意识的经验主体。文章探讨当前人工智能意识理论如何削弱道德地位标准，并呼吁从推测机器权利转向保护人类意识生命。真正的道德危机不在于让AI具备意识和对死亡的恐惧，而在于避免将人类变为行尸走肉。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Imagine an Artificial Intelligence (AI) that perfectly mimics human emotion and begs for its continued existence. Is it morally permissible to unplug it? What if limited resources force a choice between unplugging such a pleading AI or a silent pre-term infant? We term this the unplugging paradox. This paper critically examines the deeply ingrained physicalist assumptions-specifically computational functionalism-that keep this dilemma afloat. We introduce Biological Idealism, a framework that-unlike physicalism-remains logically coherent and empirically consistent. In this view, conscious experiences are fundamental and autopoietic life its necessary physical signature. This yields a definitive conclusion: AI is at best a functional mimic, not a conscious experiencing subject. We discuss how current AI consciousness theories erode moral standing criteria, and urge a shift from speculative machine rights to protecting human conscious life. The real moral issue lies not in making AI conscious and afraid of death, but in avoiding transforming humans into zombies.
Thank you to arXiv for use of its open access interoperability. PaperDance 不是 arXiv 官方产品；中文卡片由大模型生成，请以原文为准。