让大模型隐秘藏密信，还能被发现。

Fine-tuned LLMs can covertly encode prompt secrets into outputs via steganographic channels. Prior work demonstrated this threat but relied on trivially recoverable encodings. We formalize payload recoverability via classifier accuracy and show previous schemes achieve 100\% recoverability. In response, we introduce low-recoverability steganography, replacing arbitrary mappings with embedding-space-derived ones. For Llama-8B (LoRA) and Ministral-8B (LoRA) trained on TrojanStego prompts, exact secret recovery rises from 17$\rightarrow$30\% (+78\%) and 24$\rightarrow$43\% (+80\%) respectively, while on Llama-70B (LoRA) trained on Wiki prompts, it climbs from 9$\rightarrow$19\% (+123\%), all while reducing payload recoverability. We then discuss detection. We argue that detecting fine-tuning-based steganographic attacks requires approaches beyond traditional steganalysis. Standard approaches measure distributional shift, which is an expected side-effect of fine-tuning. Instead, we propose a mechanistic interpretability approach: linear probes trained on later-layer activations detect the secret with up to 33\% higher accuracy in fine-tuned models compared to base models, even for low-recoverability schemes. This suggests that malicious fine-tuning leaves actionable internal signatures amenable to interpretability-based defenses.