提出适用于数值选票的公平选择方法，解决多类集体决策问题。
A General Theory of Proportionality with Additive Utilities
- 基于数值评分设计满足比例性的选择规则
- 确保排名前缀均符合比例性要求
- 适用于预算分配、委员会选举等场景
我们研究在一般约束条件下从候选人中选出子集的模型，该模型推广了具有多样性约束的委员会选举、参与式预算（包括不同资金池项目分配约束）以及公共决策。近期为该通用模型定义了比例性公理，但现有规则仅适用于批准投票（每名选民提交一组可接受的候选人）。本文提出适用于基数选票（每位选民为每个候选人赋予一个效用数值）的比例性规则。在构建这些规则时，还引入了生成比例性排名的方法，确保排名的任意前缀都满足比例性。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
We consider a model where a subset of candidates must be selected based on voter preferences, subject to general constraints that specify which subsets are feasible. This model generalizes committee elections with diversity constraints, participatory budgeting (including constraints specifying how funds must be allocated to projects from different pools), and public decision-making. Axioms of proportionality have recently been defined for this general model, but the proposed rules apply only to approval ballots, where each voter submits a subset of candidates she finds acceptable. We propose proportional rules for cardinal ballots, where each voter assigns a numerical value to each candidate corresponding to her utility if that candidate is selected. In developing these rules, we also introduce methods that produce proportional rankings, ensuring that every prefix of the ranking satisfies proportionality.
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