AI可让政府既高效又透明,破解监管困局
Administrative Law's Fourth Settlement: AI and the Scrutable State
- 用AI转化技术复杂性为可理解语言
- 提出模型与系统档案等新规则保障可审计性
- 适合关注数字治理与行政法治的读者
自1887年以来,行政法面临机构认知难题:专家机构需管理技术复杂的系统,但专业性使决策难以被法院、国会和公众理解与监督。传统应对方式依赖记录留存、理由说明与透明度,通过程序审查维系合法性,但累积过多导致政府更难理解且效率下降。本文认为,最高法院近年的行政法收缩源于制度结构与信息处理问题。从Loper Bright到Trump v. Slaughter,法院将权力转移至其认为可理解、可归责的主体,试图重建问责制,使政府‘可查证’,却牺牲了能力并削弱行政效能。人工智能提供新路径:若正确部署,可将技术复杂性转化为可读内容,揭示隐含假设,并支持对行政推理的实质验证。这需要配套更新行政法,包括以‘模型与系统档案’扩展行政记录、设定‘模型变更触发’机制要求新流程、建立‘可审计性优先’的审慎标准。最终形成‘第四次制度安排’,在不牺牲能力的前提下恢复对行政的可理解监督。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Since 1887, administrative law has confronted a problem of institutional cognition. Expert agencies are needed to govern technologically complex systems, but expertise makes agency decisions difficult for courts, Congress, and the public to understand and oversee. Administrative law has responded to this "capability-accountability trap" by requiring records, reason-giving, and transparency, drawn together through procedural review. These devices have preserved legality but have piled up, making government both less comprehensible and less effective. This Article offers a new account of the Supreme Court's recent administrative law retrenchment, rooted in problems of institutional structure and information-processing. From Loper Bright through Trump v. Slaughter, the Court has reallocated authority to entities it regards as comprehensible and attributable. It is attempting to restore accountability by making government "scrutable," comprehensible to its overseers and the public, but in doing so it is sacrificing capability and undermining the effectiveness of administration. AI offers a different path. Deployed correctly, AI could help make government both more effective and more transparent, translating technical complexity into accessible terms, surfacing assumptions, and enabling substantive verification of agency reasoning. This technical integration must be accompanied by updated administrative law, built around a Model and System Dossier that extends the administrative record to AI decision-making; a material-model-change trigger specifying when AI updates require new process; and a deference to audit standard that rewards agencies for auditable evaluation of AI uses. The result a "Fourth Settlement," administrative law that escapes the capability-accountability trap by preserving capability while restoring comprehensible oversight of administration.
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