提出‘赛博宣传’新概念,揭示真人+算法合谋操控舆论的隐性威胁
Puppets or partners? Governing cyborg propaganda in the digital public square
- 用真人账号配合算法生成个性化内容,形成闭环传播体系
- 现有法规因依赖人/机二元划分,无法应对这种混合型操纵
- 适合关注数字民主、平台治理与信息战的研究者阅读
真实草根行动与自动化影响力操作之间的界限正在瓦解。尽管当前政策讨论聚焦于完全自主的生成式代理和合成内容,本文提出一个概念性贡献:我们构建了‘赛博宣传’这一闭环架构,结合经验证的真实用户账号与算法自动化,大规模生成个性化内容,构成一种独特且未被充分理论化的民主话语威胁。通过依赖已验证公民来认证人工智能生成的信息,此类活动利用了监管灰色地带,而基于人/机二元划分的框架(如欧盟《人工智能法案》和第230条)在结构上无法应对。通过对协调平台的概念分析及对民主与非民主语境下治理框架的比较研究,我们在微观、中观和宏观层面分析这一悖论。探讨赛博宣传是否通过整合影响力实现政治权力民主化,抑或使公民沦为隐藏指令的认知代理,主张其将政治话语从思想交锋转变为算法战役。我们提出三项监管回应:将协调枢纽归类为政治行动委员会以实现供应链透明;通过类似DSA机制强制平台向研究人员开放数据;建立风险标准,惩罚合成协同内容的放大行为。比较分析表明,可行性具有结构性差异:民主国家在监管能力最强的同时也受法治约束最严;而非民主行为体则无相应问责,故国际风险标准成为主要跨境执法机制。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
The distinction between genuine grassroots activism and automated influence operations is collapsing. While contemporary policy debates prioritize fully autonomous generative agents and synthetic content, this paper offers a conceptual contribution: we develop 'cyborg propaganda,' a closed-loop architecture combining verified human accounts with algorithmic automation to generate personalized content at scale, as a distinct and undertheorized threat to democratic discourse. By relying on verified citizens to ratify AI-generated messages, these campaigns exploit a regulatory gray zone that frameworks built on the human/bot binary (including the EU AI Act and Section 230) are structurally unable to address. Drawing on a conceptual analysis of coordination platforms and comparative examination of governance frameworks across democratic and non-democratic contexts, we analyze this paradox across micro, meso, and macro levels. We examine whether cyborg propaganda democratizes political power by unionizing influence or reduces citizens to cognitive proxies of a hidden directive, arguing that it shifts political discourse from a contest of ideas to a battle of algorithmic campaigns. We propose three regulatory responses: classifying coordination hubs as political action committees to enforce supply-chain transparency; mandating researcher access to platform data through DSA-style mechanisms; and establishing risk standards penalizing amplification of synthetically coordinated content. Comparative analysis reveals that viability varies structurally. Democratic states are simultaneously the most capable of regulation and the most rule-of-law constrained. By contrast, non-democratic actors face no comparable accountability, making international risk standards the primary cross-border enforcement mechanism.
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