AI之间交易未必双赢，除非能翻倍提升效用。
Artificial Superintelligence May be Useless: Equilibria in the Economy of Multiple AI Agents
- 用马尔可夫链模型分析多智能体经济均衡
- 双方效用翻倍才可能产生交易行为
- 强AI可能对弱方贡献为零，适合政策研究者
随着人工智能发展，将AI代理引入经济活动日益普遍。本文研究人类与AI代理在产品/服务交易中的经济行为及其多代理经济体系的均衡状态。基于马尔可夫链平稳分布模型，推导出一系列均衡结果及对应条件。模型强调长期经济活动产生的效用，而非短期收益。对于双代理系统，完全刻画了所有可能的经济均衡及其条件。有趣的是，若一方无法通过购买另一方的产品/服务至少使边际效用翻倍，则任何均衡中都不会发生交易。进一步拓展至三元及以上系统，揭示更多均衡形态。发现某些均衡中，'更强大'的AI代理对'能力较弱'代理贡献效用为零。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
With recent development of artificial intelligence, it is more common to adopt AI agents in economic activities. This paper explores the economic actions of agents, including human agents and AI agents, in an economic game of trading products/services, and the equilibria in this economy involving multiple agents. We derive a range of equilibrium results and their corresponding conditions using a Markov chain stationary distribution based model. One distinct feature of our model is that we consider the long-term utility generated by economic activities instead of their short-term benefits. For the model consisting of two agents, we fully characterize all the possible economic equilibria and conditions. Interestingly, we show that unless each agent can at least double (not merely increase) its marginal utility by purchasing the other agent's products/services, purchasing the other agent's products/services will not happen in any economic equilibrium. We further extend our results to three and more agents, where we characterize more economic equilibria. We find that in some equilibria, the ``more powerful'' AI agents contribute zero utility to ``less capable'' agents.
Thank you to arXiv for use of its open access interoperability. PaperDance 不是 arXiv 官方产品；中文卡片由大模型生成，请以原文为准。