发现大模型安全机制可拆解为‘知道’与‘执行’两个独立空间，实现‘明知故犯’。

Safety alignment is often conceptualized as a monolithic process wherein harmfulness detection automatically triggers refusal. However, the persistence of jailbreak attacks suggests a fundamental mechanistic decoupling. We propose the \textbf{\underline{D}}isentangled \textbf{\underline{S}}afety \textbf{\underline{H}}ypothesis \textbf{(DSH)}, positing that safety computation operates on two distinct subspaces: a \textit{Recognition Axis} ($\mathbf{v}_H$, ``Knowing'') and an \textit{Execution Axis} ($\mathbf{v}_R$, ``Acting''). Our geometric analysis reveals a universal ``Reflex-to-Dissociation'' evolution, where these signals transition from antagonistic entanglement in early layers to structural independence in deep layers. To validate this, we introduce \textit{Double-Difference Extraction} and \textit{Adaptive Causal Steering}. Using our curated \textsc{AmbiguityBench}, we demonstrate a causal double dissociation, effectively creating a state of ``Knowing without Acting.'' Crucially, we leverage this disentanglement to propose the \textbf{Refusal Erasure Attack (REA)}, which achieves State-of-the-Art attack success rates by surgically lobotomizing the refusal mechanism. Furthermore, we uncover a critical architectural divergence, contrasting the \textit{Explicit Semantic Control} of Llama3.1 with the \textit{Latent Distributed Control} of Qwen2.5. The code and dataset are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/DSH.