发现系统漏洞与大模型攻击结合可放大威胁,危及AI系统安全
Cascade: Composing Software-Hardware Attack Gadgets for Adversarial Threat Amplification in Compound AI Systems
- 将软件注入漏洞与硬件攻击组合,突破大模型安全防护
- 实现未修改的越狱提示注入和用户数据泄露,攻击成功率高
- 提出系统化攻击框架,适合安全研究者与防御设计者参考
生成式AI的快速发展催生了复合型AI系统——由多个大语言模型(LLM)、软件工具和数据库系统组成的流水线。这类系统基于分层传统软件栈,在分布式硬件基础设施上运行。众多软件组件存在常见漏洞(如CVE记录),底层硬件则易受时序攻击、位翻转故障和电源侧信道攻击。当前研究多聚焦于大模型特有的风险,如模型提取、训练数据泄露和不安全生成,忽视了传统系统漏洞的影响。本文研究传统软硬件漏洞如何与算法攻击协同,破坏复合型AI管道的完整性。我们演示了两种新型攻击:(1) 利用软件代码注入漏洞与防护型Rowhammer攻击,将未经修改的越狱提示注入大模型,导致安全违规;(2) 操控知识数据库,引导大模型代理将敏感用户数据传至恶意应用,造成机密性泄露。这些攻击凸显了应对传统漏洞的重要性。我们系统化梳理攻击原子操作,按目标分类并映射至攻击生命周期不同阶段,支持严谨的红队测试,并为未来防御策略奠定基础。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Rapid progress in generative AI has given rise to Compound AI systems - pipelines comprised of multiple large language models (LLM), software tools and database systems. Compound AI systems are constructed on a layered traditional software stack running on a distributed hardware infrastructure. Many of the diverse software components are vulnerable to traditional security flaws documented in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database, while the underlying distributed hardware infrastructure remains exposed to timing attacks, bit-flip faults, and power-based side channels. Today, research targets LLM-specific risks like model extraction, training data leakage, and unsafe generation -- overlooking the impact of traditional system vulnerabilities. This work investigates how traditional software and hardware vulnerabilities can complement LLM-specific algorithmic attacks to compromise the integrity of a compound AI pipeline. We demonstrate two novel attacks that combine system-level vulnerabilities with algorithmic weaknesses: (1) Exploiting a software code injection flaw along with a guardrail Rowhammer attack to inject an unaltered jailbreak prompt into an LLM, resulting in an AI safety violation, and (2) Manipulating a knowledge database to redirect an LLM agent to transmit sensitive user data to a malicious application, thus breaching confidentiality. These attacks highlight the need to address traditional vulnerabilities; we systematize the attack primitives and analyze their composition by grouping vulnerabilities by their objective and mapping them to distinct stages of an attack lifecycle. This approach enables a rigorous red-teaming exercise and lays the groundwork for future defense strategies.
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