提出可抵抗突变的领导者-追随者博弈均衡，用于模拟生物进化中的策略对抗。
Evolutionarily Stable Stackelberg Equilibrium
- 在演化博弈中设定领导者选择混合策略，追随者群体采用演化稳定策略
- 设计算法求解离散与连续博弈中的SESS，验证其在真实生物场景下的适用性
- 适用于癌症治疗等需要对抗多细胞表型进化的实际问题
我们提出一种新的解概念——演化稳定领导者-追随者均衡（SESS）。研究单个领导者与对称追随者种群之间的领导者-追随者演化博弈设置，其中领导者选择最优混合策略，预期追随者种群在诱导子博弈中采取演化稳定策略（ESS），并满足额外生态条件。我们考虑了在多个ESS中选择最优或最差领导者策略的情形，作为该框架的特例。以往方法要么通过演化动态定义追随者响应，要么假设理性最优反应，但未显式确保对突变入侵的稳定性。我们提出了计算离散与连续博弈中SESS的算法，并在连续情形上进行了实证验证。该模型自然适用于生物场景：例如在癌症治疗中，领导者代表医生，追随者对应竞争的癌细胞表型。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader selects an optimal mixed strategy, anticipating that the follower population plays an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the induced subgame and may satisfy additional ecological conditions. We consider both leader-optimal and leader-pessimal selection among ESSs, which arise as special cases of our framework. Prior approaches to Stackelberg evolutionary games either define the follower response via evolutionary dynamics or assume rational best-response behavior, without explicitly enforcing stability against invasion by mutations. We present algorithms for computing SESS in discrete and continuous games, and validate the latter empirically. Our model applies naturally to biological settings; for example, in cancer treatment the leader represents the physician and the followers correspond to competing cancer cell phenotypes.
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