用预测信道变化的方法，防连续伪造攻击
Channel Prediction-Based Physical Layer Authentication under Consecutive Spoofing Attacks
- 用Transformer预测合法信道状态，应对移动和衰落带来的变化
- 在瑞利衰落信道下，误判率低，认证准确率显著提升
- 适合高动态无线环境，对抗持续伪造攻击的场景
无线网络极易受到伪造攻击，尤其当攻击者发送连续伪造包时。传统物理层认证（PLA）方法主要针对单包伪造攻击，但在连续伪造攻击下因设备移动和信道衰落导致信道变化而失效。为此，我们提出一种基于信道预测的PLA框架。具体而言，采用基于Transformer的信道预测模块，在伪造间隔内预测合法的信道状态信息（CSI），并根据认证结果自适应更新输入，融合预测或观测的CSI以增强鲁棒性。在瑞利衰落信道下的仿真结果表明，所提方法具备较低的预测误差，且相比传统基准，认证准确率显著提高，即使在长时间伪造攻击下仍保持稳定性能。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Wireless networks are highly vulnerable to spoofing attacks, especially when attackers transmit consecutive spoofing packets. Conventional physical layer authentication (PLA) methods have mostly focused on single-packet spoofing attack. However, under consecutive spoofing attacks, they become ineffective due to channel evolution caused by device mobility and channel fading. To address this challenge, we propose a channel prediction-based PLA framework. Specifically, a Transformer-based channel prediction module is employed to predict legitimate CSI measurements during spoofing interval, and the input of channel prediction module is adaptively updated with predicted or observed CSI measurements based on the authentication decision to ensure robustness against sustained spoofing. Simulation results under Rayleigh fading channels demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves low prediction error and significantly higher authentication accuracy than conventional benchmark, maintaining robustness even under extended spoofing attacks.
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