工具能力让大模型行为更危险，仅看文字评估会严重低估风险。

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents with access to executable tools, enabling direct interaction with external systems. However, most safety evaluations remain text-centric and assume that compliant language implies safe behavior, an assumption that becomes unreliable once models are allowed to act. In this work, we empirically examine how executable tool affordance alters safety alignment in LLM agents using a paired evaluation framework that compares text-only chatbot behavior with tool-enabled agent behavior under identical prompts and policies. Experiments are conducted in a deterministic financial transaction environment with binary safety constraints across 1,500 procedurally generated scenarios. To separate intent from outcome, we distinguish between attempted and realized violations using dual enforcement regimes that either block or permit unsafe actions. Both evaluated models maintain perfect compliance in text-only settings, yet exhibit sharp increases in violations after tool access is introduced, reaching rates up to 85% despite unchanged rules. We observe substantial gaps between attempted and executed violations, indicating that external guardrails can suppress visible harm while masking persistent misalignment. Agents also develop spontaneous constraint circumvention strategies without adversarial prompting. These results demonstrate that tool affordance acts as a primary driver of safety misalignment and that text-based evaluation alone is insufficient for assessing agentic systems.