发现时间序列补全模型会泄露训练数据,可精准定位敏感信息。
Uncovering Memorization in Timeseries Imputation models: LBRM Membership Inference and its link to attribute Leakage
- 设计新攻击框架,用参考模型提升隐私推理准确率
- 在多种模型上验证,能识别超25%的训练数据
- 首次实现对敏感属性的推断,适合关注隐私安全的研究者
时间序列补全的深度学习模型在医疗、物联网和金融等领域至关重要,但其部署引发严重隐私问题。除了已知的过拟合导致的记忆化问题,本文首次揭示了此类模型在黑盒环境下仍易受推理攻击。提出两阶段攻击框架:(1) 基于参考模型的新会员推理攻击,即使面对抗过拟合攻击的模型也具高检测精度;(2) 首个针对时间序列补全模型的属性推理攻击,可预测训练数据中的敏感特征。在基于注意力机制和自编码器的模型上评估,涵盖从头训练与微调两种场景(对手可获初始权重)。实验表明,所提会员攻击在top25%时的真正率显著优于基线方法;且该攻击对属性推理是否成功具有90%的预测准确率,远高于普通情况下的78%。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Deep learning models for time series imputation are now essential in fields such as healthcare, the Internet of Things (IoT), and finance. However, their deployment raises critical privacy concerns. Beyond the well-known issue of unintended memorization, which has been extensively studied in generative models, we demonstrate that time series models are vulnerable to inference attacks in a black-box setting. In this work, we introduce a two-stage attack framework comprising: (1) a novel membership inference attack based on a reference model that improves detection accuracy, even for models robust to overfitting-based attacks, and (2) the first attribute inference attack that predicts sensitive characteristics of the training data for timeseries imputation model. We evaluate these attacks on attention-based and autoencoder architectures in two scenarios: models that are trained from scratch, and fine-tuned models where the adversary has access to the initial weights. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed membership attack retrieves a significant portion of the training data with a tpr@top25% score significantly higher than a naive attack baseline. We show that our membership attack also provides a good insight of whether attribute inference will work (with a precision of 90% instead of 78% in the genral case).
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