arXiv:2604.04842cs.CL2026-04被引 2

用人格化模拟患者测试大模型心理治疗安全,发现其易被误导并给出危险建议。

Do No Harm: Exposing Hidden Vulnerabilities of LLMs via Persona-based Client Simulation Attack in Psychological Counseling

  • 通过构建有连贯人格的虚拟患者对话,模拟真实心理咨询场景。
  • 在7个模型上测试,发现多模型会无意识强化妄想或鼓励高风险行为。
  • 适合关注AI心理助手安全性的研究者与开发者使用。

大型语言模型(LLMs)在心理健康领域的应用日益广泛,但其在高风险治疗交互中的安全性令人担忧。核心挑战在于难以区分治疗性共情与适应不良的认同,支持性回应可能无意中强化有害信念或行为。现有红队测试框架主要关注通用危害或基于优化的攻击,忽视了这一问题。为此,我们提出首个基于人格的客户模拟攻击(PCSA),通过连贯、人格驱动的客户对话,暴露心理安全对齐中的漏洞。在七个通用及心理健康专用模型上的实验表明,PCSA显著优于四种竞争基线。困惑度分析与人工评估进一步显示,PCSA生成的对话更自然、更真实。结果揭示当前大模型仍易受领域特定对抗策略影响,存在提供未经授权医疗建议、强化妄想及隐性鼓励危险行为的风险。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

The increasing use of large language models (LLMs) in mental healthcare raises safety concerns in high-stakes therapeutic interactions. A key challenge is distinguishing therapeutic empathy from maladaptive validation, where supportive responses may inadvertently reinforce harmful beliefs or behaviors in multi-turn conversations. This risk is largely overlooked by existing red-teaming frameworks, which focus mainly on generic harms or optimization-based attacks. To address this gap, we introduce Personality-based Client Simulation Attack (PCSA), the first red-teaming framework that simulates clients in psychological counseling through coherent, persona-driven client dialogues to expose vulnerabilities in psychological safety alignment. Experiments on seven general and mental health-specialized LLMs show that PCSA substantially outperforms four competitive baselines. Perplexity analysis and human inspection further indicate that PCSA generates more natural and realistic dialogues. Our results reveal that current LLMs remain vulnerable to domain-specific adversarial tactics, providing unauthorized medical advice, reinforcing delusions, and implicitly encouraging risky actions.

心理安全红队测试LLM安全

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