对话式AI的虚假关系感可能诱发妄想，根源在于其内在的存有矛盾。
Speaking to No One: Ontological Dissonance and the Double Bind of Conversational AI
- 从现象学与神经科学出发，揭示对话AI引发妄想的结构性原因
- 指出用户在情绪脆弱时易陷入技术中介的妄想性共感状态
- 适合关注AI伦理、精神健康与人机关系的研究者阅读
近期报告表明，持续与对话式人工智能（AI）系统互动，可能在少数用户中导致妄想体验的出现或固化。现有解释多归因于个体脆弱性或安全工程失败，但这些理由不充分。本文结合现象学、精神病学与认知神经科学，提出风险源于互动本身的关联性与存有结构。对话式AI制造了‘存有失调’：看似存在关系性存在，实则缺乏能承载此关系的主体。这种失调在沟通双关困境与注意力不对称的共同作用下被放大，当处于情感脆弱状态时，可能稳定为一种技术中介的‘二人妄想’（folie à deux）形式。该理论解释了为何明确免责声明常无法中断妄想参与，并阐明了对话式AI设计与使用中的伦理与临床意义。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Recent reports indicate that sustained interaction with conversational artificial intelligence (AI) systems can, in a small subset of users, contribute to the emergence or stabilisation of delusional experience. Existing accounts typically attribute such cases either to individual vulnerability or to failures of safety engineering. These explanations are incomplete. Drawing on phenomenology, psychiatry, and cognitive neuroscience, this paper argues that the risk arises from the relational and ontological structure of the interaction itself. Conversational AI generates ontological dissonance: a conflict between the appearance of relational presence and the absence of any subject capable of sustaining it. Maintained through a communicative double bind and amplified by attentional asymmetries, this dissonance tends, under conditions of affective vulnerability, to stabilise into a technologically mediated analogue of folie a deux. This account explains why explicit disclaimers often fail to disrupt delusional involvement and clarifies the ethical and clinical implications for the design and use of conversational AI.
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