AGI时代下，自主性成关键，重新定义福利经济学的适用边界。
Post-AGI Economies: Autonomy and the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics
- 引入自主性条件重构福利经济学，区分工具、代理与潜在福利主体。
- 证明在高自主性下，竞争均衡仍可达帕累托最优，但需额外制度保障。
- 适合关注未来经济制度、人工智能伦理与社会政策的研究者阅读。
福利经济学第一定理默认福利主体具有自主性，且隐含将主体分为自主与工具两类。但在后超智能（post-AGI）经济中，人工系统可能表现出不同程度的自主性，可作为工具、代理人、市场战略参与者、选择环境操纵者，甚至可能成为福利主体。本文主张该定理需加入自主性限定条件，以反映这一变化。通过一个最小化的一般均衡模型，引入自主性依赖的福利设定、福利身份分配、委托核算及验证机制，推导出在何种条件下可实现‘自主性完备’的竞争均衡，且该均衡为‘自主性帕累托有效’。经典定理在低自主性极限下得以恢复。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics assumes that welfare-bearing agents are autonomous and implicitly relies on a binary distinction between autonomy and instrumentality. Welfare subjects are those who have autonomy and therefore the capacity to choose and enter into utility comparisons, while everything else does not. In post-AGI economies this presupposition becomes nontrivial because artificial systems may exhibit varying degrees of autonomy, functioning as tools, delegates, strategic market actors, manipulators of choice environments, or possible welfare subjects. We argue that the theorem ought to be subject to an autonomy qualification where the impact of these changes in autonomy assumptions is incorporated. Using a minimal general-equilibrium model with autonomy-conditioned welfare, welfare-status assignment, delegation accounting, and verification institutions, we set out conditions for which autonomy-complete competitive equilibrium is autonomy-Pareto efficient. The classical theorem is recovered as the low-autonomy limit.
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