用博弈论证明：各国为自保可能自愿暂停超智能研发。
Are we Doomed to an AI Race? Why Self-Interest Could Drive Countries Towards a Moratorium on Superintelligence
- 用博弈模型分析大国在超智能上的利益权衡
- 当失控风险足够高时，暂停研发反而最符合国家利益
- 适合关注AI治理与国际战略的读者
本文运用博弈论论证，与主流观点相反，对人工超级智能（ASI）实施暂停令可能符合国家的自身利益。通过形式化地建模全球主要强国之间的战略互动，我们分析了技术主导优势与不可控超智能带来的灾难性风险之间的权衡。研究发现，当失控损失的感知成本相对于其他参数显著上升时，每个国家都将自身利益置于暂停研发之上。此外，我们提供了经验证据，表明全球对超智能风险的认知正在上升，这使得当前地缘政治环境下达成稳定且理性的暂停协议变得愈发可能。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
This paper uses game theory to argue that, contrary to the prevailing view, a moratorium on Artificial Superintelligence (ASI) can be in a state's self-interest. By formalizing trategic interactions between geopolitical superpowers, we model the trade-off between the benefits of technological supremacy and the catastrophic risks of uncontrolled ASI. The analysis reveals that as the perceived cost of loss of control increases sufficiently relative to other parameters, it becomes in each state's self-interest to impose a moratorium. We further provide empirical evidence suggesting that the global perception of ASI risk is rising, making a stable, rational moratorium increasingly plausible in the current geopolitical landscape.
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