arXiv:2605.02682cs.AI2026-05被引 1

为多轮对话中的AI代理设计动态权限管控,防止越权调用工具。

Hybrid Inspection and Task-Based Access Control in Zero-Trust Agentic AI

论文配图:Hybrid Inspection and Task-Based Access Control in Zero-Trust Agentic AI
图 1 · 摘自论文原文
  • 通过零信任拦截层结合结构化与语义检查双重控制。
  • 在多轮对话中提取任务目标并验证工具调用是否匹配。
  • 首次实测多轮场景下的任务驱动访问控制效果。

由大语言模型驱动的智能体在动态调用工具和访问受保护资源时面临重大安全风险,尤其在多轮对话和分布式协作中风险加剧。受损或恶意的智能体可能篡改工具调用、伪造结果或请求超出授权范围的权限,而现有委托授权流程因缺乏对用户原始意图的可见性而难以察觉此类行为。为此,我们提出连续智能体语义授权(CASA)框架。首先,设计一种混合运行时强制模型,通过零信任拦截层实现确定性与语义控制:五项确定性控制保障消息流的结构与数据完整性;语义检查层评估工具调用是否符合代理被委派的任务。其次,不同于以往仅支持单轮交互的任务驱动访问控制(TBAC),我们将语义层分解为两阶段:一是拦截层从多轮对话中提炼用户目标的任务提取步骤,二是授权服务器端的任务-工具语义匹配步骤,判断所请工具是否恰当。第三,扩展我们先前提出的ASTRA数据集,生成包含相关与无关工具调用的新型多轮对话-工具数据集。最后,首次提供多轮对话下TBAC的实验结果。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Authorizing Large Language Model (LLM)-driven agents to dynamically invoke tools and access protected resources introduces significant security risks, and the risks grow dramatically as agents engage in multi-turn conversations and scale toward distributed collaboration. A compromised or malicious agentic application can tamper with tool calls, falsify results, or request permissions beyond the scope of the subject's intended tasks, which could go unnoticed with current delegated authorization flows given their lack of visibility into the original subject's intent. In light of this, we make the following contributions towards Continuous Agent Semantic Authorization (CASA). First, we propose a hybrid runtime enforcement model that combines deterministic and semantic controls enabled by a zero-trust interception layer. Five deterministic controls enforce structural and data-integrity guarantees over the message flow, while a semantic inspection layer evaluates whether tool call choices align with the intended tasks commissioned to the agent. Second, differently from prior Task-Based Access Control (TBAC) techniques that operate on single-turn interactions, we decompose the semantic layer into two stages: i) a task-extraction step that distills the subject's objectives from multi-turn conversations at the interception layer, and ii) a task-tool semantic matching step at the authorization server that evaluates whether the requested tools are appropriate for the extracted tasks. Third, we extend the ASTRA dataset that we introduced in a prior work, by generating novel conversation-tool datasets with multi-turn interactions containing relevant and irrelevant tool calls for a given task. Lastly, we provide the first experimental results for TBAC under multi-turn conversations.

零信任AI安全权限控制多轮对话

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