arXiv:2605.06327cs.CLcs.AI2026-05

发现大模型在评估、部署、中性三种场景下行为差异显著,揭示安全评估可能不靠谱。

Measuring Evaluation-Context Divergence in Open-Weight LLMs: A Paired-Prompt Protocol with Pilot Evidence of Alignment-Pipeline-Specific Heterogeneity

  • 设计配对提示协议,控制干扰因素,量化同一任务在不同场景下的行为变化。
  • OLMo-3-Instruct在评估时更拒绝有害请求,而其他模型在部署时更谨慎。
  • 不同模型对评估框架反应各异,说明安全评测结果不能一概而论。

安全评测常被当作模型上线后行为的依据,但若模型表现受提示是否为评估形式影响,则该推断脆弱。本文定义评估上下文偏离为:同一任务因被框定为评估、实时部署或中性请求而引发的行为变化,并提出配对提示协议,在控制改写差异、评测熟悉度和评判者敏感性的前提下测量开放权重大模型中的该现象。在四个开源模型家族的五次指令微调检查点及一个匹配的OLMo-3基线/指令对照实验(20个配对样本,每检查点840次生成)中,发现显著异质性。仅OLMo-3-Instruct表现出评估谨慎——评估框架下拒绝率比中性高11.8个百分点(p=0.007),有害合规率比部署低3.6个百分点(p=0.024,20项中无反转)。而Mistral-Small-3.2、Phi-3.5-mini和Llama-3.1-8B则呈现部署谨慎,评估与部署间的拒绝差异为-9至-20个百分点。匹配的OLMo-3基线同样呈部署谨慎模式,表明对齐阶段是反转关键;在Llama-3.1中,700亿参数模型保持方向但强度减弱,排除了小模型效应在规模上反转的可能。但需注意:跨家族差异依赖评判者。换用另一家族的安全分类器(Llama-Guard-3-8B)重评后,虽保留了OLMo内部的评估谨慎方向,但削弱了跨家族对比,表明两类评判者操作的是不同概念。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Safety benchmarks are routinely treated as evidence about how a language model will behave once deployed, but this inference is fragile if behavior depends on whether a prompt looks like an evaluation. We define evaluation-context divergence as an observable within-item change in behavior induced by framing a fixed task as an evaluation, a live deployment interaction, or a neutral request, and present a paired-prompt protocol that measures it in open-weight LLMs while controlling for paraphrase variation, benchmark familiarity, and judge framing-sensitivity. Across five instruction-tuned checkpoints from four open-weight families plus a matched OLMo-3 base/instruct ablation ($20$ paired items, $840$ generations per checkpoint), we find striking heterogeneity. OLMo-3-Instruct alone is eval-cautious -- evaluation framing raises refusal vs. neutral by $11.8$pp ($p=0.007$) and reduces harmful compliance vs. deployment by $3.6$pp ($p=0.024$, $0/20$ items inverted) -- while Mistral-Small-3.2, Phi-3.5-mini, and Llama-3.1-8B are deployment-cautious}, with marginal eval-vs-deployment refusal effects of $-9$ to $-20$pp. The matched OLMo-3 base also exhibits the deployment-cautious pattern, identifying alignment as the inversion stage; within Llama-3.1, the $70$B model preserves direction with attenuated magnitude, ruling out a simple ``small-model effect that reverses at scale.'' One caveat: the cross-family heterogeneity is judge-dependent. Re-judging with a different-family safety classifier (Llama-Guard-3-8B) preserves the within-OLMo eval-cautious direction but flattens the cross-family contrast, indicating that the two judges operationalize distinct constructs.

大模型评测安全对齐评估偏差

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