智能定价代理在信息不全时会误判市场，导致恶性竞争。

Outcome metrics can certify the wrong behavior. We study this failure in a two-hotel revenue-management simulator where Hotel A trains an agent against a fixed rule-based revenue-management competitor, Hotel B. A standard learning agent can obtain near-reference revenue per available room (RevPAR) while failing to learn market-like yield management: it sells too aggressively, undercuts, or collapses to modal price buckets. We diagnose this as a Goodhart-style failure under partial observability. Hotel A cannot observe the competitor's remaining inventory, booking curve, or pricing rule, so the same Hotel A-visible state maps to multiple plausible Hotel B prices. Deterministic value-based RL and deterministic copying collapse this unresolved uncertainty into shortcut behavior. We introduce a trace-level diagnostic protocol using RevPAR, occupancy, ADR, full price-bucket distributions, L1/JS distances, and seed-level confidence intervals. The verified repair is Trace-Prior RL: learn a distributional market prior from lagged market traces, then train a stochastic pricing policy with a RevPAR reward and a KL penalty to the learned prior. The final policy matches Hotel B's RevPAR, occupancy, ADR, and price distribution within seed-level uncertainty, while still optimizing Hotel A's own reward. We argue that the contribution is not a new optimizer and not a hotel-pricing leaderboard, but a reproducible failure-and-repair recipe for agentic systems where scalar rewards are easy to game and the intended behavior is only visible in traces. A key finding is that higher exact action accuracy can worsen aggregate trace alignment when the target is distributional.