首次系统分析模型去记忆技术，揭示其防御漏洞与理论边界。

Advanced model dememorization methods, including availability poisoning (unlearnability) and machine unlearning, are emerging as key safeguards against data misuse in machine learning (ML). At the training stage, unlearnability embeds imperceptible perturbations into data before release to reduce learnability. At the post-training stage, unlearning removes previously acquired information from models to prevent unauthorized disclosure or use. While both defenses aim to preserve the right to withhold knowledge, their vulnerabilities and shared foundations remain unclear. Specifically, both unlearnability and unlearning suffer from issues such as shallow dememorization, leading to falsely claimed data learnability reduction or forgetting in the presence of weight perturbations. Moreover, input perturbations may affect the effectiveness of downstream unlearning, while unlearning may inadvertently recover domain knowledge hidden by unlearnability. This interplay calls for deeper investigation. Finally, there is a lack of formal guarantees to provide theoretical insights into current defenses against shallow dememorization. In this Systematization of Knowledge, we present the first integrated analysis of model dememorization approaches leveraging unlearnability and unlearning. Our contributions are threefold: (i) a unified taxonomy of unlearnability and scalable unlearning methods; (ii) an empirical evaluation revealing the robustness, interplay, and shallow dememorization of leading methods; and (iii) the first theoretical guarantee on dememorization depth for models processed through certified unlearning. These results lay the foundation for unifying dememorization mechanisms across the ML lifecycle to achieve a deeper immemor state for sensitive knowledge.