AI难搞定的不是物理任务，而是复杂的数字决策。

The dominant discourse on AI limitations frames the boundary of AI capability as a divide between digital tasks (where AI excels) and physical tasks (where embodiment is required). We argue this framing misses the most consequential boundary: the one within digital tasks. We identify a class of tasks we call Metis AI, named for the Greek concept of metis (practical, contextual knowledge), that are performed entirely on computers yet resist reliable AI automation. These tasks are not computationally intractable; they are institutionally, socially, and normatively entangled in ways that defeat algorithmic approaches. We distinguish constitutive metis (knowledge destroyed by the act of formalization) from operational metis (system-specific familiarity that automation can progressively absorb), and propose five structural characteristics that define the Metis AI zone: consequential irreversibility, relational irreducibility, normative open texture, adversarial co-evolution, and accountability anchoring. We ground each in established theory from across the social sciences, philosophy, and humanitarian practice, argue that these characteristics are properties of the tasks themselves rather than limitations of current models, and show that the appropriate design response is not better automation but centaur architectures in which humans lead and AI supports.