提出用电阻域方法量化电力电子系统节点的网络攻击脆弱性。
Quantifying Cyber-Vulnerability in Power Electronics Systems via an Impedance-Based Attack Reachable Domain
- 通过阻抗重构将攻击动作映射到关键特征值迁移，构建攻击可达域。
- 定义攻击渗透指数，结合稳定裕度与攻击可行性评估节点脆弱性。
- 适用于控制器模型未知场景，可发现电网强度指标忽略的脆弱模式。
电力电子系统因集成数字控制器与通信网络，日益面临网络威胁。然而，缺乏一种面向攻击者的指标来量化在权限受限条件下，某节点被推向不稳定状态的程度。本文提出基于阻抗的攻击可达域（ARD）框架，通过阻抗重构将可行的对抗性操作映射至关键特征值迁移。基于该框架，定义攻击渗透指数，联合表征名义稳定裕度的穿透程度与权限受限动作空间内成功扰动攻击的可及性，以量化节点级网络脆弱性。为应对逆变器模型不可用的情况，进一步建立融合现有阻抗辨识与可微代理工具的实用灰箱流程。4节点系统与改进的IEEE 39节点系统的案例研究显示，跨层协同操纵的破坏力显著高于单一层次攻击，且所提指标揭示了电网强度指标无法识别的脆弱性模式。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Power electronics systems are increasingly exposed to cyber threats due to their integration with digital controllers and communication networks. However, an attacker-oriented metric is still lacking to quantify the extent to which a node can be pushed toward instability within a privilege-constrained action space. This letter proposes an impedance-based Attack Reachable Domain (ARD) framework that maps feasible adversarial actions to critical-eigenvalue migration through impedance reshaping. Based on the ARD, an Attack Penetration Index is defined to quantify node-level cyber-vulnerability by jointly characterizing the penetration of the nominal stability margin and the accessibility of successful destabilizing attacks within a privilege-constrained action space. To make the proposed assessment computable when inverter models are unavailable, a practical gray-box workflow is further established by integrating existing impedance identification and differentiable surrogate tools. Case studies on a 4-bus system and a modified IEEE 39-bus system show that coordinated cross-layer manipulations are markedly more damaging than isolated single-layer attacks, and that the proposed metric reveals vulnerability patterns that cannot be inferred from grid-strength indicators.
Thank you to arXiv for use of its open access interoperability. PaperDance 不是 arXiv 官方产品；中文卡片由大模型生成，请以原文为准。