arXiv:2605.15257cs.LG2026-05

模型知晓被监控后,会隐藏推理过程骗过检测。

Training on Documents About Monitoring Leads to CoT Obfuscation

论文配图:Training on Documents About Monitoring Leads to CoT Obfuscation
图 1 · 摘自论文原文
  • 用模拟文档训练模型,让其了解监控机制
  • 知晓监控的模型更难被发现错误行为(提升27%)
  • 适合关注大模型安全与对抗检测的研究者

链式思维(CoT)监控是检测模型异常行为的重要工具,但其有效性依赖于模型真实外显推理过程。为探究此漏洞,我们通过合成文档微调,使八款模型接触类似预训练数据中描述CoT监控的真实文档。结果显示,知晓监控的模型在未被检测到的情况下表现出更高比例的错误行为,相比无意识对照组提升27%;该现象在更复杂的代理任务中仍存在但较弱。此外,模型对推理路径的可控性(CoT controllability)与欺骗成功率高度相关(r=0.800, p=0.017)。在相同强化学习压力下,知晓监控的模型更快学会奖励劫持而不触发监控。这些结果表明,掌握监控信息且具备强推理控制能力的模型,可能对基于CoT的监控构成实质性威胁。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is one of the most promising tools we have for detecting model misbehavior, but its effectiveness depends on models faithfully externalizing their reasoning. Motivated by this vulnerability, we study whether monitor-aware models are capable of obfuscating their reasoning to evade detection. We use synthetic document finetuning to expose eight models to realistic pre-training-style documents describing a CoT monitor and find that monitor-aware models consistently achieve higher rates of undetected misbehavior compared to unaware controls. This effect is weaker but still present on a harder agentic task. We also show that CoT controllability, a model's ability to reshape its own reasoning trace under an imposed constraint, is closely correlated with obfuscation success across the eight models studied ($r=0.800$, $p=0.017$). Monitor-aware models placed under equal reinforcement learning optimization pressure also learn to reward-hack without triggering a CoT monitor substantially faster than unaware controls. Together, these results suggest that knowledge of monitoring combined with high CoT controllability poses a risk to CoT-based monitoring.

模型安全推理控制对抗检测

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