分析质押投票中权力失衡问题，揭示少数大户如何主导决策
Swimming with Whales: Analysis of Power Imbalances in Stake-Weighted Governance
- 用佩纳-班扎夫指数量化投票权力，研究质押权重对决策权的影响
- 发现即使未掌握全部股份，少数大额持有者仍可完全控制投票结果
- 基于真实链上数据，揭示当前质押治理中的深层权力不平等现象
质押加权投票是权益证明（PoS）区块链的核心治理模式，但该模式易导致权力扭曲：少数拥有大量质押资产的用户可能在未掌握全部股份的情况下完全掌控决策。本文从计算社会选择视角出发，采用佩纳-班扎夫（Penrose-Banzhaf）权力指数量化权力分布，提出理论与实证双重贡献。理论上，我们证明尽管权力与质押比例完全对齐通常不可实现，但在特定条件下可期望近似对齐；实证上，基于真实链上治理系统Project Catalyst的数据，提供了对当前质押治理中权力失衡现象更精细的理解。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Voting methods weighted by stakes are the fundamental governance paradigm in Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains. Such a paradigm is known to be prone to power distortions: a few users possessing large stakes may completely control decision making, even without owning the totality of the stakes. We study this phenomenon through the lens of computational social choice, focusing on the extent of power imbalances in stake-weighted voting when power is quantified using the Penrose-Banzhaf power index. Our work presents both analytical and empirical contributions. Analytically, we demonstrate that while a perfect alignment between power and relative stake ownership is generally unattainable, it can be approximated in expectation under specific conditions. Empirically, using data from a real-world on-chain governance system (Project Catalyst), we provide a more fine-grained understanding of the power imbalances that are likely to occur in current stake-weighted governance systems.
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