比较儿童与大模型在不确定性下的推理能力，发现两者行为相似但信息获取方式不同。

Real world decision-making requires constructing mental models under uncertainty over evidence, over the underlying causal rules, and over the state of the world itself. Which computational principles underpin human inference under such conditions, and do LLM-based agents exhibit similar behavior given matching constraints? We address these questions using an inductive inference Box Task in which participants, human children and LLM-based agents, infer a latent cause through sequential interaction with an uncertain environment. We formalize this task as program induction with Bayesian particle-based inference, admitting two complementary interpretations: (1) as a constraint satisfaction process over hypotheses, and (2) as a program synthesis problem in which hypotheses are executable programs evaluated against evidence. Using the constraint-based formulation, we show that children's behavior is best explained by a combination of subjective evidence reliability and online hypothesis generation, accounting for both their evidence-seeking patterns and their dissociation between task completion and rule generalization. Using the program synthesis formulation, we treat LLM-based agents as model organisms: controllable systems that allow systematic manipulation of task conditions. Across backends, LLM-based agents replicate children's responses to changes in evidence reliability and observability, including discounting unreliable evidence, seeking to resolve partial information, and dissociating between task completion and causal generalization. At the same time, LLM-based agents tend to over-observe and over-comply with instructions relative to children. These results suggest that while children and LLM-based agents adapt similarly to environmental structure, their information-seeking behavior exhibits distinct underlying costs and inductive biases.